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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Radicalization, Religion, Terrorism Extremism, Militancy, Rehabilitation, Disengagement, De-radicalization, Recidivism	The religious outfits have emerged like a juggernaut force in Election, 2018, though all the religious parties opposed existence of Pakistan. The political history of Pakistan is a saga of confrontation among political and extremist elements. The political Islamists wield considerable strength on the country disproportionate to political and electoral power. Islamist political groups served as coalition partners and strengthen the political capital of streamline parties. The phenomenon of mainstreaming and reintegration of religious organizations into mainstream political parties become piece de resistance when they started showing muscles over sit-ins and coercing Government into acceding their demands by hook and by crook. Political mainstreaming of religious outfits is demanded vigorously on the affirmation of renouncing violence by banned organizations turned religious political parties. Thus, the radicalization does not imply violence. The radicalization has plagued whole world. The prudent in-depth "analysis of embedded counter terrorism drives and stratagems will enhance vision and help in abridging lacunas and gaps for effective de-radicalizations" offensive.
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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is passing through hardships of the terrorism that are painful and nefarious in its essence. We are entangled in a dilemma that terrorism is home-grown or externally forced upon us. The proliferation of radicalization and the allied causes such as poor governance, extensive social injustice, poverty, lack of education, illiteracy and stale and inert Madrassa and public education has compounded the problem from worse to worst. At this critical juncture redoubtable presence of religious banned outfits and participation in the political process is worrisome. It is horrific equally when these proscribed organizations still cling to their violent ideology. Popularity of religio-political organizations is manifest from their

election results as they bagged almost 9% share of total votes in the Election, 2018. The mainstreaming of religious parties is harmful without rejecting of violence and extremist ideology. The upsurge of religious extremism and concomitant predominance of violence and militancy have caused considerable mayhem and distress all over world. The adoption of extreme views and resort to violent means to express the resentment and misgiving is described as violent extremism and radicalization.

Government can incapacitate and disrupt network of banned organizations by exercising ample caution in apprehending the first and second tier of the leadership of these banned organizations. This action will make these organizations rudderless and eliminate rallying capacity to stage widespread protests. Though, crackdown against these outfits can foment discontentment and disquietude among religious organizations but lack of action on the part of Government will embolden proscribed organizations to aggrandize their motives and materialize their dreams at their free will. The timely deterrent action will go a long way in discomfiting the banned organizations and interdict them from collection of funds in name of Deeni Madaris/ Masajid and welfare of needy persons. The banned outfits must be dealt with iron hands to purge "society from menace of extremism" and parochialism. The paper will also try to briefly examine the measures taken to offset these issues, gauge their success and make recommendations whether any special, anti-radicalization, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization measures need to be undertaken in the case of Punjab, in the light of the findings.

Militancy in Pakistan reflects that the rubrics of politics merge with the vested interests of international actors to consolidate identity gaps in political process. Radicalization is theory and process where youth are induced to adopt extreme ideology, corrupt certain groups and accept violence. For example, radicalism can originate from a broad social consensus against progressive changes in society. Radicalization can both violent and non-violent, although most academic literature focuses on the radicalization that manifests into violent extremism" (Dubouloz 2010).i It is concern of both academia and security establishments to devise ways and means to combat menace of growing radicalization through process of prevention, reclamation, restoration and after care protection programs. "De-radicalization is the process of changing individual's belief system, rejecting extremist ideology, and clinching mainstream values. The de-radicalization is particularly difficult for the extremists who infuse inspiration from religion. Nevertheless, de-radicalization may be indispensable to permanently avert the threat posed by these individuals. There is a point of view that de-radicalization may not be a realistic objective and that goal of terrorist rehabilitation programs should be disengagement" (Rabasa, 2010).ii

In the wake of 9/11 and US invasion of Afghanistan to find traces of outlawed Osama Bin Laden and clamp down on Al-Qaeda, religious parties grouped together to form Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal alliance, sparking religious bigotry and embittered political environment.

Surfacing of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and holy nexus of diverse religio-political parties in the 2002 elections and claiming multitude of electoral seats in the National and Provincial assemblies of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Balochistan flabbergasted every critic and the same trend continued till election 2018 when smorgasbord of banned outfits pervaded the whole election scenario. The forging of religio-political parties culminated into hefty alliance which jolted the machinery of Government. Religious parties intruded into politics before the Indo-Pak Partition. The Anti-Qadiani moment of 1954, The Shia-Sunni conflict after the incident of Babe-Umer, the invasion of USSR on Afghanistan, the exploitation of religion on the pretext of Jihad, the aftermath of 9/11 and the macabre incident of Jamia Hafsa are watershed events that engender violence and radicalization in society.

Mainstreaming of Religious Outfits

The ideological appeal due to social privation and alleged grievances renders the supreme role in preserving the perennial distress and terrorism cycle of innocent mass. General Musharaf volte-face upon incumbent policy towards Taliban Government met with severe blow from the side of Madaris and religious outfits (Javaid, 2011).iii The military strategists were oblivious of cardinal point of termination and disengagement of recruits and war-veterans at the culmination and accomplishment of task. The Jihadist were abandoned and disowned. The left-over military arsenals were then utilized by these Jihadists. The Muslims plight especially in Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya was miserable. The first intifada was commenced in Kashmir at end of 1990. The notorious global terrorist organization namely Al-Qaida was emerged out of this chaos and mayhem. It is only after 9/11, the world was awakened out of its deep slumbers and abdicated its cosmetic and ad-hoc character to deal with the violent extremism and terrorism. The repercussion was very redoubtable, the plethora of Madaris came into the arena to recruit and train the naïve mind of students of Madaris.

The definition of terrorism is, "a term used to depict strategy or the hypothesis behind the technique whereby a composed gathering or gathering looks to accomplish its admitted points predominantly through the orderly utilization of viciousness".iv The mainstreaming of banned religious outfits is an uphill and grueling task given the religious dichotomy and religion-based terrorism. Peace in Pakistan is subject to mainstreaming of religious outfits. Religious organizations in Pakistan have been governing religious sentiments of masses. The people had been used on name of religion without understanding the need of hour and sensitivity of situation. Most of time, it ensued that religious seminary had given command and their adherents blindly acted upon command resultantly, many fatalities were ensued. In backdrop of 9/11 after being deprived of state ownership, the religious outfits opted to take the populist route by aggrandizing the gigantic anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Their splendid accomplishment by adopting anti America voice however culminated into formation of coalition government in two smaller provinces of Pakistan. The fate of religio-

Political parties in the political sphere continue to wax and wane, but not approach to take over the Government let alone state itself (Javaid, 2011).v

The current political scenario, right-wing political parties are afraid of strength of extreme right-wing parties as they had placed more candidates to foil their political victory. When we have deep insight into the emergence of religio-political parties, it came to surface that all the parties are offshoot of defunct parties. For example, the “Pakistan Rah-e-Haq Party (PRHP) stemmed from Sipa-e-Sahaba party and Allah o Akbar Tehreek came to front as a shadow party of the Hafiz Saeed-led Jamatud Dawa”, Tehreek Labaik Pakistan, the brain child of Maulvi Khadim Rizvi’s have placed on electoral roster more contestants than the MMA jointly. Election commission record manifested that nascent Tahreek Labaik Pakistan TLP fielded 178 candidates for total seats of 272 directly elected constituencies’ jurisdictions against the joint venture of MMA has “nominated a total of 192 candidates for 272 directly elected constituencies of National Assembly”. MMA’s focus was on the turbulent regions of KP and Balochistan where MMA have had vote, while TLP coveted seats from Punjab where it has chosen 141 contestants with another 32 from Sindh, 6 from Balochistan and 16 from KP.vi Proscription of religious outfits served as supreme cause. After proscription of Sipa e Sahaba Pakistan, Maulana Ahmad Ludhanwi established Ahle Sunnat wal Jammāt (ASWJ).

Table 1 Political Clout of Religious Outfits Election 2018

SN	Name of Religious outfit	National Assembly	Provincial Assembly
1	Mutahida Majlis e Aml (MMA)	12	20
2	Tehrik e Labaik Pakistan	-	02
3	Milli Muslim League	-	-
4	Allah o Akbar Tahreek	-	-
5	Islami Tahreek Pakistan	-	-
6	Majlis-e-wahdat-ul-Muslemeen	-	-
7	Nazame-Mustafa	-	-
8	Ithade-Ummat- Pakistan	-	-

Source: Election commission of Pakistan (<https://www.ecp.gov.pk/>)

Assessment

The emerging strength of TLP in 2018 elections is considerable development that could have long lasting impacts in future on many counts. First, considerable electoral strength clearly manifested growing popularity of religious parties among public. This religiosity will increase in the future and natural corollary would be the strength of religious bigotry and hardliners in corridor of power. A “comparison of its performance with that of MMA would show that more radicalized elements within religious sects are gaining popularity”. This electoral rise is definitely license to get political legitimacy. Second, electoral process of TLP definitely buttressed the value of Barelvis who were overshadowed by Deoband.

The political strength of Barelvis definitely strengthen radicalism in their ranks. The entry of religious parties strengthened the ambit of religio-political parties (Shruti Punia, 2018). The 'Mainstreaming' of religious groups per se is praiseworthy goal provided; the religious groups are de-radicalized and reintegrated in society. Otherwise, rejuvenation of religious groups legitimizes the banned outfits and bigoted elements. The political legitimacy took the radicalized elements into the portico of parliaments and the fallout will be weakening of enlightened elements.

Proscription of Religious Organizations- Pivot of De-Radicalization Efforts

After the devastating attack of 9/11, 2001, it was decided to crack down on extremist and militant religious organizations. This was most crucial step to curb the growing influence of militancy. In this connection, according to Counter Terrorism Department data base, following religious organizations are banned in Pakistan and some are under observation by Government.

Table 2 Notifications of Proscribed Organizations

SN	NAME OF ORGANIZATION	BANNED (NOTIFICATION NO.)
1	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. (L J)	Notification No. SRO-No. 7/26/2001-poII.I(3) dated 14-08-2001
2	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan. (SMP)	N.No. SRO-No. 7/26/2001-poII.I(3) dated 14-08-2001
3	Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)	Notification No. SRO-17(I)2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002
4	Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)	Notification No. SRO-18(I)2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002
5	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	Notification No. SRO-19(I)2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002
6	Tehrik-e-Jafferia Pakistan (TJP)	Notification No. SRO-20(I)2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002
7	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)	Notification No. SRO-21(I) 2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002
8	Tehreek-e-Islami	Dated 14.01.2002
9	Al-Qaeda	Dated 17.03.2003 R.G 260/2003
10	Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP)	Notification No. SRO-1037(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (i) dated 15-11-2003
11	Khudam-ul-Islam (KUI)	Notification No. SRO-1038(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (ii) dated 15-11-2003
12	Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP)	Notification No. SRO-1039(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (iii) dated 15-11-2003
13	Hizb-ul-Tahrir (HUT)	Notification No. SRO-1061(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (i) dated 20-11-2003
14	Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JUA)	Notification No. SRO-1062(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (ii) dated 20-11-2003
15	Jamat-ul-Furqan (JUF)	Notification No. SRO-1063(I) 2003 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) (iii) dated 20-11-2003
1	Khair-Un-Naas International Trust (KNIT)	Notification No. SRO.F.No.7/26/2001-poll.I (3)(iv), dated 27-10-2004

SN	NAME OF ORGANIZATION	BANNED (NOTIFICATION NO.)
2	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	SRO File No.7/26/2001-PoII. I(3) Dated 07.04.2006
3	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan (ISMP)	Notification No. SRO. No.1/17/2006-poll.I (2),dated 21-08-2006
4	Lashkar-e-Islam	SRO No. 7/26/2001-Poll-I (3), dated 03.06.2008
5	Ansar-ul-Islam	SRO No. 7/26/2001-Poll-I (3), dated 03.06.2008
6	Haji Namdar Group	SRO No. 7/26/2001-Poll-I (3), dated 03.06.2008
7	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Notification No. SRO NO 7/26/2001-Poll-I(3) dated: 25.8.2008
8	Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)	Notification No. SRO. No.16/1/2010-poll.I (2),dated 08-09-2010
9	Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)	Notification No. SRO. No.16/1/2010-poll.I (2),dated 08-09-2010
10	Lashker-e-Balochistan (LEB)	Notification No. SRO. No.16/1/2010-poll.I(2),dated 08-09-2010
11	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	Notification No. SRO. No.16/1/2010-poll.I(2),dated 08-09-2010
12	Balochistan Musallah Difah Tanzeem (BMDT)	Notification No. SRO. No.16/1/2010-poll.I(2),dated 08-09-2010
13	Shia Tulba Action Committee, Gilgit.	Notification No. SRO. No. F.16/1/2010-poll.I(2), dated 10-10-2011
14	Markaz Sabeel Organization, Gilgit.	Notification No. SRO. No. F.16/1/2010-poll.I(2), dated 10-10-2011
15	Tanzeem Naujawan-e-Ahle Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit.	Notification No. SRO. No. F.16/1/2010-poll.I(2), dated 10-10-2011
16	Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi	SRO. No.F.16/1/2010-PoII.I(2), dated 10.10.2011
17	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ)	N.No. SRO. No. F.1/1/2012-poll.I(2), dated 15-02-2012
18	Rabita Trust	Notification No. F.1/11/2011-Poll.1(2), dated 06.03.2012
19	Al Harmain Foundation	Notification No. F.1/11/2011-Poll.1(2), dated 06.03.2012
20	Anjuman-e-Imamia Gilgit- Baltistan	Notification No. F.1/5/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 24.04.2012
21	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit- Baltistan	Notification No. F.1/5/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 24.04.2012
22	Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat,	Dated 05.06.2012
23	Balochistan Bunyad Parast Army	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
24	Tehreek Nafaz-e-Aman	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
25	Tahafuz Hadudullah	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
26	Balochistan Waja Liberation Army	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
	Baloch Republican Party Azad	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
27	Balochistan United Army	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012
28	Islam Mujahidin	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.1(1), dated 04.08.2012

SN	NAME OF ORGANIZATION	BANNED (NOTIFICATION NO.)
1	Jaish-e-Islam	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.I(1), dated 04.08.2012
2	Balochistan National Liberation Army	Notification No. F.1/9/2012-Poll.I(1), dated 04.08.2012
3	Khana-E-Hikmat Gilgit Baltistan, Gilgit	Dated 13.03.2013
4	Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
5	Tehrik-e-Taliban Mohmand (TTM)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
6	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
7	Abdullah Azam Birgade	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
8	East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
9	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
10	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
11	313 Brigade	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
12	Tehrik-e-Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	N.No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
13	Amar bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir (Haji Namdar GP)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
14	Baloch Student Organization Azad (BSO-A)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
15	United Baloch Army (UBA)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
16	Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM)	Notification No. F.1/3/2013-Poll.I (1), dated 15.03.2013
17	DAISH/ISIL/IS/ISIS	S.R.O. No.F.1/1/2012-Poll.I(1)/2015, dated 15.07.2015

Table 3 Proscribed by United Nation

1	Al-Akhtar Trust	Notification No. S.R.O NO.1273(1)/2005 Dated 10.12.2008
2	Al-Rasheed Trust	Notification No. S.R.O NO.1273(1)/2005
3	Jamaat-ul-Da'awa (JuD)	1. No.6/31/2008(O&I)/NCMC dated 11.12.2008 2. U.O No. UN (I) 5/2/2008- C dated 11.12.2008 (Notified by UN & NCMC)
Kept Under Observation		
4	Sunni Tehrik (ST)	N.No. SRO-22(I) 2002 No.F.7/26/2001-poll.1(3) dated 14-01-2002

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority (<https://www.nacta.gov.pk/>)

CHALLENGES TO COUNTER BIGOTRY AND EXTREMISM

The cold war between USSR and USA was most formidable cause of dictatorship in almost whole of the third world; Pakistan was becoming victim of this scourge. The military took the rein of power in 1958 with invocation of first Martial Law and overwhelmed the national

scene for more than three decades out of next six decades found strategic partner in these religious circles to combat with common enemy i.e. all elements cherishing and struggling for a rapid amelioration in economic, political and social status quo (Javaid, 2011).vii The enormity of predicament is exacerbated by a number of outlandish factors, ranging from the religio-political to ethnic mélange. Nature abhors vacuum. In this connection, the space created by interregnum of whole some activities are filled by violence and abhorrent activities. When the rights of people are denied and trampled then void created and extremists took advantages of this power vacuum and thrive in the free environment. The social burdens, inequality and philanthropic activities by these groups further enhance their legitimacy among the masses as they present themselves as 'messiahs' for the people, and build the strength around their narrative of being weak and fighting against the cruel forces of the infidels.

The Russian onslaught of Afghanistan gave both dictator and radicals who were always in quest of legitimacy to the most of their luck. Both radicals and dictators emerged as the guardian for the safety of regime sustainability and survival of the state of Pakistan (Javaid, 2011).viii At culmination of Operations Rah-e-Raast, operation Zarb-e-Azb and operation Radd-ul-Fasad, some Religio-political parties having the extremist outlooks started to take part in politics under garb of political lebensraum but still refused to renounce extremist ideology. At domestic front, confusion still prevailed either to accept these religio-political parties or abandon them. It is also a fact that such political parties who are ideologically biased and hard core in their narratives are prone to adopt extremist viewpoints in politics and the recalcitrant to forego their violent ideologies and resultantly it is really difficult to integrate the banned outfits into mainstream politics. It is sin-qua-non for religious outfits to abandon/relinquish their violent ideologies for their re-integration and mainstreaming into political battle. 'Musharraf's volte-face on Pakistan's Taliban policy met with ferocious resistance

Response Regime

The response of the regime is lackadaisical and of appeasing in nature. In beginning the response of the Government to rising sectarian violence was limited to the introduction of few regulations, which were never implemented in letter and spirit. One of major factors of this response was lackluster political support. National Counter Terrorism Authority was established but was never made functional. It was after Zarb-e-Azab and APS Peshawar incident that a National Action Plan was formulated. In Punjab, Government introduced a new Counter Terrorism Force within Counter Terrorism Department. In this connection, the religious outfits are being emerged as pressure groups. They exploit the religious passion of individuals in society. In this regard, the National Action Plan is a welcome step but it seems passive and indolent on the de-radicalization, reintegration and de-weaponization (Babakhel, 2015).ix

Table 4 De-Radicalization Approaches

Approach	Strategy	Focus	Objective
Societal	Engagement	Vulnerable communities	Developing moderate tendencies
Security	Rehabilitation	Detainees	Reducing security Threats
Ideological	Peace, amity, serenity, tolerance and reconciliation has been emphasized	Clergy	To counter ideological underpinnings with existence of counter narrative to quell the militancy.
Political	The acceptance and approval at the level of general masses and host community	Society at large	The obliteration of security perils

Source: Pakpips.com/article/1522

This de-radicalization approach measures at societal, security, ideological and political level. Diverse strategies are adopted to attain the objective of deradicalize the hard liners (Rana, Swat Deradicalization Model: Prospects for rehabilitating Militants 2011). Result of 2018 elections reflected that though religious vote is on the peripheral but played crucial role in striking the balance among mainstream political parties. The electoral history exhibits that the religious parties was used to strengthen the political clout by powerful political parties in order to fulfill short term and myopic political goals. This greedy joust for the short-term political win only aggravated predicament of Pakistan hostile against extremism, militancy and intolerance (Faiz, 2018). No citizen and non-state institution has a right to advocate religiosity. In this regard, Islamist opposes legal reforms which curtail their powers as they always opposed reform in public school curricula and regularization of Madrassa reforms (Afzal, 2018).

CONCLUSION

The mainstreaming of the banned politico-religious parties is paramount but imperil the equilibrium in society as well. The seeds of intolerance which were sown way back, have taken the shape of the tree. There are certain issues and challenges which are peculiar to Punjab which need peculiar attention. Government has tried to contain the tide but much more is still required. The hegemony of religio-political underpinnings and exploitation in private hands is perilous and riddle with multiple indomitable pitfalls. In this connection, the same is happening with Pakistan as it has five boards working under the five Wifaq's. Experience of Muslim countries of Turkey, Malaysia or Indonesia, Pakistan's mainstream political parties, should enhance its services to train patience, diversity and pragmatism in politics, where religious underpinnings are not soiled with violent ideologies. In this regard, this practice will definitely enhance the sectarian and communal harmony on the political platform.

The inculcation of political pragmatism is never to infringe the religious freedom of any political party. In Pakistan, every individual and political party has every right and freedom

to adhere to any political ideology but extremism blights very foundation of any country. Proscribed and defunct organizations are not allowed to put forth their political claims. The benevolence of De-radicalization is the elixir of militancy and violent extremism. Instead of taking individual approach to rehabilitate the terrorist, the collective approach is advisable as it focuses on terrorist groups, causes and way to come out of malevolent radicalization. Swat rehabilitation model is unique in its results. Saudi-Arabia presented a rehabilitation model based on prevention, rehabilitation and after care programmes (PRAC), Sri-Lanka achieved results after successful realizing Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARC). Yemen evolved Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC) for the rehabilitation of militants. Singapore devised a Religious Rehabilitation group (RRG) to exterminate the violent radicalization from society. Indonesia sought help of former militants in order to reform the prisoners.

The penitent militants help authorities in disseminating the message of peace and project their disillusionment before their fellow incarcerated inmates in order to motivate them to relinquish violent extremist ideologies. A change in paradigm would work lot in improving the extremist attitude. In this connection, our society is victim of the extremist rhetoric and misinterpretation of religious injunctions. Intensive religious debate and psychological counselling well placed mechanism to rehabilitate the interneees and after care surveillance help militants to avoid relapsing and recrudescence to combat activity. The disparities in resource availability need to be addressed at the earliest. The credible religious figures and intellectual anchors need to be engaged to have discourse with militants and make them realize of their doing's contravention of not only religion but also established norms of society.

Way Forward

- ✓ Zero tolerance for all
- ✓ Administration of Justice and strict enforcement of law
- ✓ National Interest
- ✓ Regional interests/powers
- ✓ Capacity Building of the fighting arms and continued cooperation between LEAs
- ✓ Strict watch on recruitment and funding of militants
- ✓ Registration, Monitoring Regulation of all Madaris
- ✓ Electronic and social media (Roles & Responsibilities)
- ✓ De-radicalization: Socio-Economic Solutions
- ✓ The ideological reorientation of religious parties
- ✓ The repudiation of the creed of violence
- ✓ The writ of law and empowerment of governance bodies

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