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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Hybrid Regime, Politics, Civilian, History, Democracy, Stratocracy	<p>The term hybrid regime has recently become very popular in the Pakistani politics. Not many people outside the select group of political scientists were even aware of concept only a decade ago. This paper discusses this concept in detail in context of Pakistan's political history to prove that hybrid regime is not an anomaly but a norm in Pakistan's political system and that Pakistan's regimes throughout the history were neither pure democracies nor absolute stratocracies. It proves that from inception till this day Pakistan has always had hybrid regimes. Government is framed apparently by civilian political people, but somewhere the role of establishment in governmental affairs is absolutely undeniable. This study aimed to explore the leading issues that are considered as significant contributors towards the political regime along with its implication towards desired change. In this connection, present study uses the qualitative content analysis technique for data analysis for finding the answers of the research questions and reaching the desired conclusion of study. Thus, the findings reveals that the government in Pakistan is neither liberal democracy nor authoritarian rather; the government in our country is hybrid regime.</p> <p> 2023 Journal of Social Research Development</p>
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INTRODUCTION

Most of the states in the world today can be placed in category of hybrid regimes. Many African, South Asian, Southeast Asian, Central Asian & Latin American regimes can be dubbed as hybrid (Sebok & Boda, 2021). It means that these regimes are neither pure democracy or pure autocracies but a fusion of both. Basic principle in democracy is that in its people get to enjoy political equality (Muller, 2021). Difference between a democracy and authoritarian regime is based on factors like,

free and fair elections, accountability, role of military, neutrality of judiciary etc. Are elections free and fair and held at regular intervals? A regime to be termed a liberal democracy must be able to answer questions like these in affirmative. Do these states ensure vertical & plane accountability? Is military firmly under civilian control? Fundamental rights of the people are protected or not? Independence of judiciary is ascertained or not? And above all, the rule of law is ensured or not? A democracy might have its own flaws but its advantages far outweigh them like, there is the direct relationship between democracy and economic development (Sebok, Boda, 2021). All such cases are non-democratic but non-authoritarian, hence, hybrid. Hybrid regimes lack some of these values of liberal democracy. Still different hybrid regimes differ from each other as some might be closer to ideal democracy than others but all of them are in middle, neither are they liberal democracies nor entirely authoritarian. For example, Indian democracy might be better than Pakistani variant but is it a liberal democracy?

The answer is in negative as India might hold elections at regular intervals unlike Pakistan where military interrupts electoral process every now and then yet when it comes to rule of law, essential rights, accountability etc. it is found wanting (Amnesty International, 2017/2018). As for origins of hybrid regimes are concerned there are many cases. Some like Russia are product of single party rule, others like Pakistan are the result of military coups, and some are born from democratic erosion like Brazil. They are non-authoritarian since there are some of the characteristics of democracy that such regimes uphold to create a smoke screen. For example, there have been many military regimes in Pakistan, but every one of those military dictators made sure to hold elections and allowed the politicians and political parties to become part of the state apparatus. Similarly, in Russia, elections are regularly held to choose the president and the members of the Duma, but those elections always bring incumbents back to power. Hybrid regimes so inhibit authoritarian and democratic features at the same time and are commonly found in developing world. Pakistan's politics has always been marred by instability with constant breaks of military and civilian rule. Military rule is termed as martial law and civilian rule as democracy. This research contests both these concepts by proposing that Pakistani regimes throughout history is the mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements hence hybrid regimes.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Hybrid regimes are sometimes also defined as competitive authoritarianism because the party in power does take part in elections, the president has autocratic powers, and the system of checks and balances is weak (Diamond, Plattner, & Walker, 2016). This definition of hybrid regimes focuses on the absence of important ingredients of liberal democracy, i.e., system of checks and balances. Even though elections are held but they do not lead to the formation of accountable government, rather they empower an autocratic leader. According to Diamond, Plattner and Walker in hybrid regimes the power is concentrated in the executive at cost of other pillars of state and state officials have the power to move countries to deeper authoritarian rule. Still elections are held but, in such regimes, there is no regard for other important elements of the liberal democracy, and elections is just one of many elements for a regime to be called a liberal democracy. Levitsky and Way (2010) term these regimes as “competitive authoritarian” (p.3). According to them, in the debate of democratization,

hybrid regimes are categorized as “flawed, incomplete, transitional democracies” (p.3). What makes these democracies flawed is that instead of fulfilling the criteria of liberal democracy, they partake from authoritarianism.

There is semblance of competition in the form of elections, but those elections are manipulated by several means, like media manipulation, violence, and use of state resources to favor incumbents. Also, they mention Larry Diamond and Fareed Zakaria, who use terms electoral democracy and illiberal democracy to describe hybrid regimes. So, the hybrid regimes are given different names by different political theorists, but these regimes share, more or less, some similar elements like those of ignoring constitutional limits, human rights, civic and political freedoms and rule of law that make them less than a democracy and more than authoritarian. They are more than authoritarian in the sense that they do hold elections or have many sources of information and some other elements of a democracy. They are called pseudo democracies, illiberal democracies, poor democracies, empty democracies, modest authoritarian regimes and so on but they are always superficial and weak. As [Diamond \(1999\)](#), says that the lack of constitutional spirit is one of main weaknesses of such regimes and that this is the case in most of third wave illiberal democracies in the Third World. This sounds particularly true in case of Pakistan where one thing that has remained missing during its history is constitutional stability.

Diamond further says that such regimes however cannot be called non democracies because they have the system that tolerates alternative parties and formal democratic structure even though in spirit, they are weak and hollow. In this connection, they hold the elections but these elections are based upon the clientelistic ties and the populist, personalistic (rather than programmatic) appeals ([Diamond, 1999, p. 34](#)). Naturally, regimes that are formed as a result of such electoral process are bound to be devoid of the constitutional spirit that Diamond talks about. The elected members will be more interested in short; the term gains and they will spend state resources to satisfy the needs of their cliental instead of using their energies to perform their primary duties, i.e., the legislation and policy formation. Hybrid regimes therefore may hold multiparty elections, but these elections are also flawed and unfair. They do not truly express will of the people rather will of the people is itself deployed by use of force, violence and propaganda. “Typically, the hybrid regimes hold multiparty elections-but degree of competition remains restricted in several important ways” ([Norris, 2014, p. 175](#)). Norris also refers to elections that are constrained in many ways and simply speaking they are neither fair nor free.

The hybrid regimes thus have many names, but whatever their name may be, they are not true or liberal democracies. They might hold elections and exhibit some of the elements of a democracy but in spirit they are always authoritarian. This area of hybrid regimes became focus of research in the mid-90s, in post-communist era. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of many independent central Asian states gave impetus to the research in this area, as such states became case studies for discussion of hybrid regimes: “peculiarities of post-communist state development have important implications for our understanding not only of state-building, but of institutional underpinnings of democratic and autocratic rule” ([Leibfried, Huber, Lange, Levy, Nullmeier, & Stephens, 2015: 587](#)). They further discuss the peculiarities of the post-communist state development. They say that post-

communist states developed differently from familiar process of state development in two ways particularly. One, the elites were making all the decisions regarding the structure of institutions for those states. Second, struggle within the elite. Different groups within the elite were competing with each other for power. The institutions that were created as result of this approach were bound to be autocratic in spirit because elite were always going to protect their own interests first and not the interests of the populace.

Since the communist system had failed, alternative was democracy. The elites formed institutions, i.e., the parliament, electoral system, a constitution etc. but these institutions were controlled by the elite itself and hence the resulting regimes would be democracies only in name, a façade to hide the real autocratic face, thus hybrid regimes. The entire discussion on hybrid regimes comes down to the fact that theoretically speaking, there are different systems of governance in the world, democracy and authoritarianism being the two extreme ends of spectrum. But when it comes to the real world, there appears to be a plethora of systems that lie in-between. In real world, different states create systems in their own social, economic, political and cultural context. "Specifically, potential need for a hybrid type arises when real world cases unify elements belonging to different established types, for example the simultaneous existence of pluralist elections (a feature of democracies) and media repression (feature of autocracies)" (Stewart, Klein, Schmitz, Schroder, 2012: 15). In this linking, most of developing countries in world today have some sort of hybrid system, because ground realities in these areas of the world make it difficult to implement either democracy or authoritarianism in its entirety.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In Pakistan, there have been four military coups, but every military dictator had to borrow some of the tools of democracy to justify and legitimize the military rule, thus creating hybrid system. Also, the democratic governments were also not able to adopt all the elements of democracy in letter and spirit because they were limited and restrained by the deep state, so they had to give space to the establishment at the cost of their own authority, thus sacrificing one of the key elements of liberal democracy, civil supremacy. Thus, all the regimes in Pakistan whether military or democratic have always been hybrid in spirit. In this regard, the research is qualitative in nature as it analyzes various ideas and concepts related to political history of Pakistan. In this connection, the concept of hybrid regimes provided the broad structure for the study. Consequently, the conceptual framework is an all-encompassing superstructure that offers groundwork to root one's research in. Content analysis technique was used for the data analysis because it is a suitable method to identify the themes and patterns in the text.

Purposive sampling also referred to as subjective sampling technique provided the liberty to use my judgment as researcher to select sample which was most suitable for the study. Various research tools provide assistance to collect data for the analysis, which include library of Hazara University Mansehra and other internet sources are searched to gain information related to the topic. Research in the social sciences has no specific method to prove its reliability and validity; nevertheless, the authenticity has been ensured in discussion with friends, fellow researchers, and reviewers. Scholars have provided detail review of various tenures of rulers since the independence of the country and

reached to conclusion that government system in country is hybrid in nature. Various theorists have been read and cited in this paper on selected research area to provide objection analysis to achieve research objectives.

RESULTS OF STUDY

This study offers enough evidence from Pakistan's political history to prove that Pakistani regimes from its very inception were neither democratic nor authoritarian but hybrid in nature. This study clearly proves that Pakistan's political history can be broadly divided into two types of regimes, military and civilian. In this linking, it is important to note that these regimes that governed Pakistan in intervals were apparently different in the sense that military regimes were led by military chiefs and civilian governments were led by civilian rulers but if looked closely it becomes clear that the military rulers always had to collude with civilian politicians to stabilize their governments and had to hold elections. Similarly, the civilian rulers always found it necessary to include the military establishment in the governance of the state as it was impossible to rule without their help in letters and spirit.

DISCUSSION

"The guiding principle of state functioning should be supremacy of parliament" (Nadeem, 2020: 9). Pakistan's history however is a different story. In 1947 Pakistan became a free state as the British left, and India was divided into two independent countries. Pakistan faced great difficulties in those early days. It had no infrastructure, industry, institutions or manpower to run the affairs of the state. As Murphy (2013) says that Pakistan faced extreme economic crisis in the very beginning because all the industry was in India. Most of the professionals who were Hindus had left Pakistan. There was communal violence and migration. He further says that Pakistan's geography was also a problem as its East and West wings were so far apart. And to top it all most of the politicians were opportunistic. It was in these circumstances that Pakistan had to devise a constitution that would be based on the ideals of liberal democracy. In this regard, Pakistan at that time lacked capacity to do so. "When Pakistan came into being it lacked an emplaced system of the government capable of governing" (Stern, 2001: 126). Pakistan had neither physical nor institutional resources to begin with. Political parties are the backbone of any liberal democracy. And as Stern says that Pakistan had no national political parties.

Muslim League led the movement for independent state for Muslims of India, but it did not evolve into an institution like Indian Congress party. Muslim League was formed by some of the prominent members of Muslim elite and after partition it became party of strong men rather than a democratic institution. And this is true for all of Pakistan's political parties. "In Pakistan, politics is made up of a large number of the leading persons who, with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it" (Almond, & Coleman, 1960: 198). Landed elite in the very early days "had captured state and used it to further its own interests regardless of the law" (Martin, 2015: 46). This elite has remained a constant presence in Pakistani politics, and has seldom accepted law of the land, instead it has been running a parallel system throughout Pakistan's history. As Martin further says that these landlord politicians concentrated economic and political power and pursued particularistic interests of their kinship, clan and factions and "undermined state's role as provider

of public goods like health care, justice, housing, and even education” (p.67). Martin terms Pakistani democracy as mediated democracy as only a minority of voters are autonomous and they control the votes of the rest.

Thus, the landed elite has always remained important factor in creating Pakistan’s hybrid regimes, be it a military or a civil government. Coming back to the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was leading person in Muslim League and Muslim League had to begin process of democratization as was promised by it during campaign for Pakistan. But very soon it became clear that Pakistan’s journey on road to democracy would be fraught with many the bump. Jinnah concentrated power in his own hands citing the Indian threat and this set a pattern that continues in Pakistani politics to this day (Jaffrelot, 2016). Jinnah thus himself set aside the ideals of democracy and sacrificed them at the altar of state security. Muhammad Ali Jinnah first Governor General of newly independent country had promised a state that would be democratic and liberal. Where there will be freedom of alleged and expression. People will be free to profess and practice their religion. Rights of minorities will be protected. The country will pursue policy of peace and prosperity. As he said in an interview, “The new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, cast or creed” (Munir, 1980, p. 29). Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was that of liberal democracy on the model of Western democracies.

But when it came to the implementation of this vision, things took different turn. As Murphy (2013) says that even in Jinnah’s lifetime tilt towards authoritarian rule could be felt as Jinnah himself became an all-powerful ruler. He was committed to democracy during independence movement but once he became governor general his decision making was not democratic (p.51). This approach worked to detriment of political parties and Muslim League itself. Soon after the death of Jinnah cracks began to appear in the party. Liaqat Ali Khan, the first prime minister tried to maintain the unity of the party, but he was assassinated in 1951 and after that chaos ensued as one government followed another within matter of the seven years. Martin (2015) during these years Muslim League was reliant upon civil-military bureaucracy and maintained a façade of parliamentary democracy without holding any elections. The first constitution was promulgated in 1956 but it could not last very long as military took over for the first time in 1958. “Ayub Khan banned political parties and erected a local government scheme that was to serve as democratic facade for his rule” (p.71). in this connection, since that day Pakistan has seen four martial laws and intervening civilian regimes but as is the point of this research, all of them were hybrids, i.e., neither true democracies nor autocratic to the core.

“In Pakistan all the four military governments sought to keep the prevalent constitutional set-up intact” (Kukreja, 2005: 45). All military dictators made sure to uphold the ideals of true democracy and took power in order to deliver on the promise that they will rule temporarily and introduce a democratic system where corrupt politicians will have no role. All of them remained in power for much longer than they promised and in order to survive they colluded with same politicians that they were supposed to punish and wore the mask of democracy to gain legitimacy. As Kukreja says that all military dictators held referendums and elections as tools of democratization. But these

elections were never fair and free. He calls it cosmetic civilianization of military rule. And this is the way it has been throughout Pakistan's history. Similarly, the intervening civilian governments were also accused of being autocratic. From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif all civilian rulers have been termed as the autocratic by their opponents. In this linking, "Nawaz Sharif's authoritarianism resulted in a struggle between the autocratic civilian rule and benign military dictatorship" (p.61). Political leaders in Pakistan tend to concentrate power in their own hands instead of delegating it to the institutions.

They never introduce democracy within their own political parties and party leadership always remains within their families. But elections are held, national and provincial assemblies are formed, and an illusion of democracy is created whereas many an important criterion of a liberal democracy is done away with, i.e., free and fair elections, civil supremacy and rule of law. According to Kukreja one main factor in Pakistan's failure as the state is the ambivalence about the form Pakistani state should take: "a secular state, a democratic state, a theocratic state or a military authoritarian state" (p.87). In these situations, even the most recent report regarding the diverse issues and about state of democracy in Pakistan by Freedom House is grim and the country is termed partly free ([Freedom House, 2023](#)). Pakistan has always pursued democracy but never completely embraced it and it has had many dictatorships but never truly involved that idea either. Hence it has always witnessed hybridity. Political history of Pakistan is a proof that the democracy remained a dream and what Pakistan got instead were many an experiment from the parliamentary democracy to bureaucratic regimes to military rule. Interesting fact is that nearly all Pakistani regimes to date have been some sort of hybrids.

Even military rulers who began their rules as dictators had to manufacture some sort of democratic setup to legitimize their regimes, hence creating hybrids. Ayub Khan abrogated first constitution of 1956 and replaced it with a martial law but soon after, he introduced another constitution in 1962 and got himself elected as president ([Siddiqi, 2019](#)). General Ziaul Haq and Musharaf tampered with constitution of 1973 but did hold elections and gave a role to political parties in governance. Similarly, the so-called democratic governments in the intervals were always restrained in one or another way by military, and other state institutions like judiciary and bureaucracy. As [Jaffrelot \(2016\)](#) says that military and civilians were both responsible for failure of democracy in Pakistan. Pakistan has always pursued democracy but never completely enjoyed as military dictators refined political patronage and politicians always helped them establish their rule. Jaffrelot further says that military regimes always had constitutionalize their rule. Every military dictator after assuming power promised a true democratic system for country and held elections. Political entities always participated in these elections and shared power with the military ruler. Thus, creating regimes that were hybrid.

Similarly, as [Almond and Coleman \(1960\)](#) say that because Pakistan does not have a proper two or multiparty system and politicians who do not adhere to a policy or program, but control money and legislature always prosper. This means that governments formed by such politicians are going to be under influence of military and other state institutions hence not liberal democracies but hybrids. As [Cohen \(2011\)](#) says that military has been the dominant force in Pakistan throughout its history

despite its experiments with democracy. He further says that though democracy has been unable to take root, authoritarian rule has been unable to gain legitimacy. According to him Pakistan has experimented with different constitutions, but constitutionalism has never come to fruition and this lack of consensus on these foundational issues has been cause of many problems that Pakistan has faced over years. Many of Pakistan's problems like lack of good governance, weak political parties, other internal security issues, "stem from failure of process of constitutionalism" (p.94). Cohen says that because authoritarianism does not enjoy support of people, it cannot be sustained for very long, so every dictator has to wear democratic mask by making a king's party and bringing it into power by holding elections.

This dispensation also cannot survive for very long, so army takes the back seat, and an ineffective democratic setup takes its place until people are tired of it too and army comes back, and this cyclic movement continues. In this linking, [Riaz Ahmed \(2010\)](#) says something similar when he talks about military/parliament divide throughout Pakistani history. Thus, he says that Pakistan's transition to democracy is always impeded by military, taking control covertly or overtly. Military rulers try to impose their own definitions of democracy which is to delegate power to local bodies at the cost of a powerful parliament. Thus, they create a system which Riaz describes as the "controlled democracy" (p.9). Pakistani regimes whether democratic or military have always sung the mantra of a transition to true or real democracy. Every government tries to gain legitimacy by pleading to the public and the world that the democratic experiment being undertaken by them is the right one and must be given a chance. From the first constitution of 1956 to the first military regime of Ayub Khan till the present democratically elected regime, the story remains the same, military and parliament at odds and vying for space in the political setup. Neither one remains in the absolute control for long nor relinquishes it.

The resulting regimes therefore are a hotchpotch of autocracy and democracy. According to [Hasan \(2007\)](#) Pakistani constitution provides for democratic principle to hold elections to form a sovereign elected parliament but elections seldom result in the formation of such a parliament. Establishment is always more powerful than the elected representatives and in the matters of policy structure they have little say. Hasan gives the example of 2002 elections, when a parliament was elected, and the prime minister was the chief executive of the country, yet the same parliament passed laws to give powers to President Musharaf and allowed him to keep the office of military chief as well. Besides, military was given role in civil setup by creating the National Security Council and more than the thousand jobs were given to military officers in civilian institutions. This dispensation therefore was not a democratic one, but it was neither pure the authoritarian rule because after all there was an elected government in place. Thus, [Stern \(2001\)](#) also finds military's constant involvement in politics as main impediment in the development of the democracy in Pakistan. Consequently, he says that parliaments in Pakistan are not responsible to the electorate rather military and its agencies hold the real power.

There is an interdependent relationship between the dominant elite, the military and bureaucracy. [May and Selachon \(2004\)](#) terms Pakistan a praetorian state where the military dominates political institutions and processes. According to May different governments in Pakistan failed to implement democratic norms and ideals. Ayub Kahn civilianized his military rule by holding the elections and

making political elite partner. Bhutto focused power in his own hands rather than strengthening the democratic institutions, Zia ul Haq also tried to civilianize his military rule by holding party less elections. Hence, be it a general in power or civilian, military has been dominant force in Pakistani politics. Generals try to civilianize their governments; the civilian governments turn a blind eye to democratic ideals and concentrate power in their own hands instead of delegating it to other arms of the state as I have discussed elsewhere in this chapter. [Kapur \(2006\)](#) says that the fear of majority rule compelled the elite and military in Pakistan in different circumstances because after all there was an elected government in place and to avoid modern democracy. He alludes to the incidents of 1958 and 1970 in this context. To create parity with Eastern province of Pakistan, West was made one unit in 1958.

In 1970 Yahya Kan held elections in which Sheikh Mujib's Awami Muslim League gained majority but power was not transferred to it. Majority rule is one of the main principles of the democracy, but Pakistani regimes compromised this principle at altar of national security. Kapur also discusses the Ayub regime and its experiment with system of Basic Democrats. It was indirect system of election meant to elect Ayub Khan as president and to empower him through a democratic façade. It was therefore a democratic system that empowered a military ruler. Wolf in sheep's clothing, a hybrid. This picture of Pakistani states' experiments with diverse regimes is very relevant to my hypothesis. My point is similar that Pakistan is unable to manufacture and implement any permanent political system to run country. Constitutional democracies have been ineffective, as Cohen calls them, since even when army takes backseat, it never leaves civilian rulers free to rule as they please. It is always the dominant force on matters of internal and foreign policy and military rulers have to rely on some democratic institutions to gain legitimacy and this results in hybrid regimes that are neither democracies nor authoritarian but mixture of both. And such regimes are generally more prone to cause state failure.

[Kalia \(2011\)](#) says that democratic governments of Pakistan have been unable to uphold democratic principles. According to him Pakistan has a tribal and feudal culture where feudal, military and religious elite dominate the politics. Democratic principles like rule of law, accountability, and free judiciary go contrary to elite's interests. Kalia gives examples of different democratically elected rulers of Pakistan who did not uphold principles of democracy and their regimes therefore cannot be called democratic. He mentions Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto who all came to power by elections held under the 1973 constitution but all of them ignored the principles of democracy during their terms in office. According to him Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not adhere to democratic principles because he did not give smaller provinces their rights, terminated provincial assemblies, Islamized the country to retain power, and worked for interests of feudal elite. He thus weakened the democratic institutions, and his regime cannot be called democratic if we apply the democratic principles discussed in Larry Diamond's model. Consequently, it was not authoritarian regime as elections were held and Bhutto was elected as prime minister by the elected parliament of Pakistan.

Nawaz Sharif's stint in power has also been described as autocratic even though he has been elected thrice to the office of prime minister. As Kalia gives the example of his first term in office in 1990.

Even though elections were held yet Nawaz Sharif was helped by establishment and Benazir party was even kept from campaigning for the elections. This again is an element of hybrid regimes where elections are held but they are not free and fair but always tilted in favor of the favorite. In Pakistan the establishment or military chooses favorite and backs it and brings it to power. Again, in a liberal democracy civil supremacy is considered supreme and military is firmly under its control but not so in Pakistan. Military always plays part in elections and influences results. This again is a distinctive of hybrid regimes. After the elections it does not disappear from scene but remains involved in the everyday affairs of state. Kalia mentions Benazir Bhutto time in office & says that her government was also not following democratic principles. In her second term in office, she dismissed provincial assembly of NWFP and interfered in the superior judiciary by appointing judges of her own liking. Judiciary in a liberal democracy should be independent and free in every sense of word. But this has not been case in Pakistan as accusations is laid against judges for taking sides in political affairs of the state.

Kalia mentions the incident in Nawaz Sharif's second term in office when he engaged in a personal conflict with then chief justice of the Supreme Court and his party workers even stormed it. Chief Justice was removed at end of this ugly conflict. According to [Saddiqa \(2019\)](#), the period from 1999 to 2018 was different from past experiments of what she terms fusionist model in the sense that the parliaments were allowed to complete their terms but not the governments. She points out the role of judiciary as tool for the army during this period. She mentions, how Supreme Court removed two elected prime ministers from office. She further mentions military, judiciary nexus in 2018 general elections, to get Imran Khan elected. According to her, 21st century political model in Pakistan is different in three ways. First, army' support of Imran Khan might be tactical move to bring in a new actor in politics and thus sideline old players. Second, military took advantage of the social change in past two decades and rise of new urban middle class. Imran Khan being educated and from the same middle class became perfect choice for this class, and army too. Third, this new fusionist model is perfect for army, since Imran's government has left it independent in matters of strategic decisions. As per Saddiqa, Pakistan today has controlled democracy, where elections are held, but military is a permanent guardian.

CONCLUSION

Hybrid regimes might be a popular term in present day Pakistani politics and frequently debated idea on all sorts of media platforms but if we look closely at Pakistan's political history it becomes evident that hybrid regime is not something new but a constant presence. From its very inception individuals and institutions of Pakistan encroached upon each other's powers to give rise to a hybrid system. Military regimes and civilian governments were all a hybrid of some elements of democracy and authoritarianism with varied ingredients of both. Military establishment made early inroads in the civilian setup during the first decade of the independence. Ayub Khan's martial law started as a military dictatorship but soon transformed into a hybrid system of a military ruler and an indirectly elected parliament. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became civilian martial law administrator in beginning and later was accused of the accumulating dictatorial powers. General Zia ul Haq held party less elections and assembled a parliament. General Musharraf also had to hold party-based elections

and share power with the politicians. In short, hybrid system started with inception of Pakistan and continues to this day.

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